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ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE BASE ON HEALTH, EMPLOYABILITY AND THE 
LABOUR MARKET: LESSONS FOR ACTIVATION IN THE UK   
Colin Lindsay, Bent Greve, Ignazio Cabras, Nick Ellison, Steve Kellett 
 
Abstract  
  
This article draws on the research of authors participating in this Special Issue, as well as a 
broader evidence review on how health, disability, labour market inequalities and other 
factors contribute to high levels of benefit claiming among certain communities. We argue 
that the evidence points to a complex combination of factors feeding into high levels of 
disability benefits claiming in the UK and beyond, namely: concentrations of health problems 
and disability-related barriers; gaps in the employability and skills among certain 
disadvantaged groups; and labour market inequalities the limit the quantity and quality of 
work opportunities for people with health and disability-related limitations in some regions. 
The article then provides a comparative, critical commentary on the evolution of activation 
and welfare reform policies in the UK and Denmark. Specifically, we discuss the extent to 
which emerging active labour market policies, occupational health services and changes to 
the benefit system in both countries reflect the evidence on the nature of the barriers faced by 
people on disability benefits. The article concludes by identifying recommendations for 
health, employment and labour market policies. 
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Introduction  
  
Despite recent attempts by UK policy makers to restrict access to incapacity and disability 
benefits (hereafter DB), the numbers claiming remain high by historical terms, with 
approximately 2.5 million people receiving these forms of income support in 2014. Neither 
the UK, nor liberal welfare states in general, are unusual in facing persistently high levels of 
DB claiming (although disability claim rates in other than liberal welfare systems such as the 
US are also higher than the OECD average) (OECD 2010).  Rather, above average levels of 
disability claiming have also been reported in Nordic welfare states like Sweden and 
continental welfare regimes such as the Netherlands (Lindsay and Houston 2013).   
  
The need for policy action to assist people on DBs is not disputed. Spending long periods on 
these benefits has been associated with further deteriorations in health (Bambra 2011); the 
meagreness of payment rates in countries like the UK means that claimants experience 
increased poverty risks (Kemp and Davidson 2010); exclusion from work may undermine 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶HPSOR\DELOLW\Shuttleworth and Green 2011); and, given the context of an 
ageing labour force, there is a more general need for interventions that will assist people to 
manage health problems in the workplace rather than exiting to long-term welfare 
dependency (Vickerstaff et al. 2011). However, there remain concerns that current policy 
agendas are not equal to the task of moving large numbers of people from DBs into 
sustainable employment. Indeed, the main focus of UK Government policy appears to be on 
restricting access to DBs by tightening eligibility criteria and means-testing, with little sign of 
a coherent strategy to enhance the employability and health of those already on benefits 
(other than directing claimants to a generic, compulsory activation programme ± The Work 
Programme ± RURWKHUIRUPVRIµZRUN-UHODWHGDFWLYLW\¶/LQGVD\ and Houston 2013).  
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This article seeks to offer advice on more productive foci for welfare reform and activation 
policies. We do this by: reviewing the latest HYLGHQFHRQWKHµQDWXUHRIWKHSUREOHP¶LHWKH
factors contributing to high levels of DBs among some groups and communities); analysing 
the appropriateness of current and recent policies in responding to these factors; and (briefly) 
FRQWUDVWLQJWKH8.¶VDSSURDFKZLWKWKDWRI'HQPDUNZKLFKKDVGHSOR\HGDGLIIHUHQWVHWRI
policy instruments in its efforts to reduce DB numbers. In order to conduct this analysis of 
the nature of the problem and evaluation of policy solutions, we carried out a structured 
literature review identifying the most robust evidence from both academic sources and policy 
stakeholders. The reliability of this approach was strengthened by its coverage of research 
from a range of disciplines (reflecting the multi-disciplinary expertise of the authors) 
including: economic geography; social policy; clinical psychology; and public health policy 
analysis. The findings of our analysis are presented below. The analysis also draws on the 
latest research published elsewhere in this Special Issue of Social Policy & Administration. 
The article then concludes with a discussion of implications for future policy development.     
 
Assessing the evidence base: factors behind concentrations of disability claiming   
 
As noted above, over the past decade, successive UK Governments have deployed relatively 
consistent policies to address high levels of DB claiming. Much of the focus of policy has 
been on restricting access to, and increasing the conditionality associated with, welfare 
benefits, along with a greater emphasis on activation, first under the Pathways to Work 
initiative (2003-10) and now the Work Programme, the main activation programme for 
people of working age. However, it has been suggested that the general thrust of policy fails 
to reflect the complex combination of factors that explain concentrations of DB claiming 
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(Beatty et al. 2009). FolloZLQJ/LQGVD\DQG+RXVWRQ¶V) line of argument, we now 
assess the latest evidence on the extent to which three key issues can be identified as 
underlying the high level of disability benefits claiming in the UK, namely: concentrations of 
health and disability-related barriers among the claimant group; gaps in their employability 
and skills; and labour market inequalities and the impact of low quality work on opportunities 
for people with health and disability-related limitations. We will then go on to discuss the 
failure of policy makers to develop joined-up, spatially-focused solutions to these problems. 
 
Health and disability-related barriers  
One of the distinctive features of the discourse around disability benefits in the UK is policy 
PDNHUV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRIXOO\DFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKRVHFODLPLQJWKHVHEHQHILWVDUHLQGHHGVLFNRU
disabled. Policy makers have partly sought to justify this position with reference to a well-
established evidence base suggesting that industrial restructuring and job destruction in 
regions dependent on traditional employment sectors preceded increases in DB claiming. 
Seminal works during the mid-1990s by Beatty and Fothergill (1994), Green (1994) and 
Webster (1997) identified concentrations of DB growth in post-industrial labour markets, 
suggesting that Incapacity Benefit (IB, then the main disability benefit in the UK) was 
absorbing displaced workers and hiding the real level of unemployment. These authors 
ZLVKHGWRH[SRVHWKHµKLGGHQXQHPSOR\PHQW¶SUREOHPLQRUGHUWR demonstrate the need for 
regional demand-side stimulus policies to generate more job opportunities for those trapped 
on benefits (Beatty and Fothergill 2005), but their argument has been appropriated by the 
political right as evidence of malingering among claimants (Centre for Social Justice 2009).    
  
Yet this is a misrepresentation of both the evidence and the argument. Indeed, Beatty et al¶V
VHPLQDOµWKHRU\RIHPSOR\PHQWXQHPSOR\PHQWDQGVLFNQHVV¶K\SRWKHVized that 
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µKLGGHQVLFNQHVV¶ZDVDVLPSRUWDQWDVµKLGGHQXQHPSOR\PHQW¶LQH[SODLQLQJKLJKGLVDELOLW\
claiming in some regions. They argued that there is substantial ill-health and work-limiting 
disability throughout the labour force ± among those in work, job seekers who are available 
for work, and those receiving DBs. Labour market conditions decide whether those with 
health or disability-related barriers are able to find their way into ZRUNGXHWRHPSOR\HUV¶
willingness to adjust their demands in tight labour markets) and manage their conditions in 
the workplace. But this need not lead us to conclude those on DBs are feigning illness.   
 
Rather, there is substantial evidence as to the reality of the health and disability-related 
problems faced by people claiming DBs. Targeted survey exercises have found that ill-health 
or limiting disability was the reason that most DB claimants left work in the first place; and 
that health problems are perceived to be a key barrier to work (Beatty et al. 2010; Kemp and 
Davidson 2010). Longitudinal surveys with claimants have found that those with multiple 
and/or more serious conditions are significantly PRUHOLNHO\WREHµSHUPDQHQWO\VLFN¶ (i.e. 
remain on benefits); while those with fewer conditions are more likely to find work (Sissons 
and Barnes 2013). For those re-entering, but failing to sustain, work following a period on 
DB, a further decline in health has been identified as a common problem (Dixon and 
Warrener 2009).  Large-scale national population surveys such as the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) suggest long-term relationships between health and labour market 
status (Jones et al. 2010); and that ill-health is a predictor of exits to long-term DB (Disney et 
al. 2006). Analyses of national health surveys have identified a significant relationship 
between DB claiming and mortality (Bambra 2011). NHS professionals working with DB 
claimants confirm evidence of a range of health problems and disabilities (Lindsay and 
Dutton 2013). These NHS specialists and other health service providers have used well-
established, clinically robust measures to identify health problems among the DB group, and 
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to register improvements following condition management interventions (Kellett et al. 2011). 
2WKHUUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHVLPLODUO\XVHGDFFHSWHGFOLQLFDOWRROVVXFKDVWKHµ+RVSLWDO$Q[LHW\
DQG'HSUHVVLRQ6FDOH¶WRLGHQWLI\VLJQLILFDQWO\SRRUHUKHDOWKDPRQJWKH'%FODLPDQW
populDWLRQWKDWLVUHVLVWDQWWRLQFUHDVLQJH[SRVXUHWRFRQGLWLRQDOLW\DQGRUµLQFHQWLYHV¶DVSDUW
of changes to the benefits system (Garthwaite et al. 2014). In summary, there is powerful 
evidence that health and disability-related limitations reported by those on DBs are real. As 
we will confirm below, other factors ± and crucially the nature and extent of labour demand ± 
tend to define whether such health and disability-related barriers can be managed in the 
workplace, or alternatively exclude people from the world of work.  
 
[NOTE TO CO-AUTHORS: WE WILL ADD REFERENCES TO EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED ELSEWHERE IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE HERE.] 
 
Employability-related barriers 
We have seen above that, contrary to some SROLF\PDNHUV¶FODLPVhealth and disability-
related barriers are key to understanding the nature of the DB problem. Yet, successive UK 
Governments have been keener to portray the problem as rooted in the attitudes and 
behaviour of those claiming benefits. As we will see below, increased conditionality and 
compulsion in the DB system appear to reflect a consensus among policy makers on the need 
to XVHILQDQFLDOLQFHQWLYHVDQGSXQLWLYHVDQFWLRQVµWRJHQHUDWHSRVLWLYHEHKDYLRXUDOHIIHFWV¶
(DWP 2010: 10). 
 
Yet the evidence on the existence RIDµGHSHQGHQF\FXOWXUH¶ among DB claimants is limited. 
Beatty et al¶VH[WHQVLYHVXUYH\UHVHDUFKZLWK'%FODLPDQWVGHSOR\HGDUDIWRI
attitudinal questions to tease out negative views around work, but instead found little 
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evidence of abnormally low levels of work commitment. Nor were DB claimants expert in 
µSOD\LQJWKHV\VWHP¶LHSDUWLFXODUO\NQRZOHGJHDEOHDERXWbenefit regulations). These 
findings add to a long-established evidence base that contradicts rhetoric about individual 
claimants choosing to live on benefits (Dean and Taylor-Gooby 1992) and popular myths 
about families defined by multiple generations of worklessness (Shildrick et al. 2012). 
Rather, evidence from in-depth research with DB claimants finds that many report recurring 
poverty and insecurity when struggling to cope on benefits, while their experiences of the 
benefits system (and especially increasing conditionality) tend to be defined by stigma and 
distress (Garthwaite 2013).     
 
That said, people on DBs tend to demonstrate a variety of views about work. Green and 
6KXWWOHZRUWK¶VDWWLWXGLQDOUHVHDUFKZLWK'%FODLPDQWVIRXQGWKDWDrange of factors 
PRVWQRWDEO\DJHDQGKHDOWKVKDSHGSHRSOH¶VRSWLPLVPDQGOHYHORIFRPPLWPHQW to work. 
.HPSDQG'DYLGVRQ¶VORQJLWXGLQDOUHVHDUFKVLPLODUO\LGHQWLILHGGLIIHUHQFHVLQOHYHOV
of work commitment among the DB group, although other variables related to health and 
employability ZHUHPRUHSRZHUIXOSUHGLFWRUVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶FKDQFHVRIUHWXUning to the 
labour market. Webster et alDUJXHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHVHYerity of 
health limitations and regarding the state of the local labour market tend to be inter-
connected, and negative views can be mutually reinforcing, producing pessimistic self-
evaluations of both health and employability.   
 
So attitudes to work vary considerably ± LW¶VMXVWWKDWWKHUHLVOLPLWHGHYLGHQFHWKDWLQGLYLGXDO
motivation or commitment are decisive in explaining the labour market exclusion 
experienced by those on DBs (Kemp and Davidson 2010). Nevertheless, there is stronger 
evidence that long-term DB claimants face a complex range of other employability-related 
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barriers to work. Extensive survey work with those on DBs demonstrates that they are 
significantly more likely to report: basic skills problems; low levels of qualification; gaps in 
work experience and repeated periods of unemployment; limited social network ties to those 
in work; and barriers in accessing transport (Kemp and Davidson 2009, 2010; Beatty et al. 
2010, 2013; Barnes and Hudson 2013). Such combinations of employability-related barriers 
are common among people excluded from the labour market, and call for holistic activation 
programmes that are flexible in addressing the complex problems faced by disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
[NOTE TO CO-AUTHORS: WE WILL ADD REFERENCES TO EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED ELSEWHERE IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE HERE.] 
 
Labour market barriers  
Successive UK governments have been reluctant to acknowledge the spatial labour market 
inequalities that clearly shape the nature of the DB problem. As a result, governments have 
IDYRXUHGµDQDWLRQZLGHVXSSO\-VLGHVWUDWHJ\¶/LWWOHRYHUORFDODQGUHJLRQDO
policies that reflect the differences in demand across labour markets. Yet, the evidence 
suggests that labour market inequalities are fundamental to explaining why people in certain 
communities are more likely to find themselves trapped on DBs. As noted above, Beatty et 
al. (2000, 2009, 2010, 2013) have amassed a compelling evidence base demonstrating that 
DB claiming is concentrated in those regional labour markets that experienced large-scale job 
destruction following industrial restructuring. For example, in post-industrial cities, processes 
of job destruction associated with the decline of manufacturing were never fully reversed 
GXULQJWKHµORQJERRP¶RIWKHVDQGVZKLFKSURGXFHGXQHYHQJURZWKRIWHQLQ
casualized and low-paid service work (Webster et al. 2013). Lindsay and Houston (2011: 
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707) have similarly mapped DB claiming (before and after the ESA reform in the UK) 
FRQFOXGLQJWKDWµWKHPDSRIFODLPUDWHVFRUUHVSRQGVWRDUHDVRIIRUPHULQGXVWULDOGHFOLQH¶3XW
simply, there is nothing particularly distinctive about DB claimants in post-industrial labour 
markets, there just many more of them (Webster et al. 2010); and this can be explained by the 
fact that there are not enough jobs to absorb people who otherwise might be able to cope with 
their health conditions in the workplace. Elsewhere, in tightµIXOOHPSOR\PHQW¶ODERXU
markets where demand is strong, employers are required to adapt their expectations and 
people with health and disability-related limitations are more likely to be absorbed into the 
world of work (Beatty et al. 2013). 
 
Employers and jobs may be of broader importance in understanding the DB problem. First, 
HPSOR\HUV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRPDNHDGMXVWPHQWVWRDFNQRZOHGJHKHDOWKOLPLWDWLRQV ± such 
altering job content or work environment, or allowing changes to working hours or phased 
returns to work ± can be crucial in facilitating re-integration for people on DBs (Kemp and 
Davidson 2010). Within the workplace, support from line managers has proved important in 
sustaining successful transitions from DB (Irvine 2008). Claimants regularly cite the 
identification of a µsympathetic employer¶ as being central to their plans to return to work 
(Green and Shuttleworth 2010: 234). However, such support and willingness to make 
adjustments can be rare ± instead, employers sometimes appear to target those with health 
limitations for redundancy (Easterlow and Smith 2003). Increasingly aggressive absence 
management policies can also exacerbate health problems among existing employees, while 
militating against a culture of adjustment and inclusiveness that might assist returners-to-
work (Taylor et al. 2010).  
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Furthermore, the nature and quality of jobs may negatively impact on the opportunities open 
to people with health and disability-related limitations. As noted above, post-industrial labour 
markets may not have enough jobs to absorb people with health problems who could 
nevertheless manage some work. But the low quality of jobs in these labour markets may also 
contribute to the DB problem and throw up barriers to work for claimants. For example, exits 
to DBs are likely to be more common in labour markets dominated by casualized and short-
WHUPHPSOR\PHQWZKHUHHPSOR\HUVFDQPRUHHDVLO\µPDQDJHRXW¶HPSOR\HHVZLWKKHDOWK
problems (Little 2009). More specifically, underemployment (where employees are unable to 
secure sufficient hours or pay) seems to feed into the DB problem. Low-paid, part-time 
employees whose wages fail to meet the minimum National Insurance threshold are not 
eligible for employer-paid Statutory Sick Pay, and are therefore more likely to leave work to 
claim DBs. For people at the bottom end of a polarized labour market, the benefits system is 
therefore µZRUNLQJDVDIXQFWLRQDOHTXLYDOHQWRIVLFNSD\¶.HPSDQG'DYLGVRQ   
 
The nature of the working life in poor quality jobs may also be relevant. Claims that low-
paid, entry level positions remain a stepping stone to better jobs appear contradicted by 
ZLGHVSUHDGµF\FOLQJ¶EHWZHHQZRUNDQGUHSHDWHGEHQHILWFODLPLQJ0F&ROOXP)LQDOO\
in workplaces that are iQWHQVLILHGDQGµ/HDQ¶, or where employees have little control over the 
standard operating procedures that define how and where they work, there may be less scope 
to manage health issues (Carter et al. 2013). %DXPEHUJ¶VUHVHDUFK± modelling a 
combination of health variables drawn from the BHPS and job content data from skills 
surveys ± presents compelling evidence that a decreasing sense of control among employees 
over the past two decades has contributed to ill health and even higher levels of disability 
claiming. $V$QGUHDVVHQQRWHVVXFKMREVµREOLJHHPSOR\HHVWREHVXEMHFWHGWR
working regimes that make demands on when, where, with whom and with which standards 
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the work tasks have to be performed. Employable workers must live up to culturally and 
VRFLDOO\GHILQHGQRUPVRIDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXUDQGDSSHDUDQFH«$VVHVVLQJZRUNFDSDFLW\
in a narrow sense of the term omits the labour market's many social and cultural demands 
ZKLFKFRQVWUXHSHRSOHDVHPSOR\DEOHRUQRW¶There are few spatial studies quantifying the 
impact of changing quality across different regional economies, but we might hypothesize 
that the dominance of low quality jobs in post-industrial labour markets (Shildrick et al. 
2012) could be an additional factor contributing to concentrations of DB.  As Patrick (2012: 
FRQFOXGHVVLFNDQGGLVDEOHGSHRSOHVHHNLQJWRUHWXUQWRZRUNµIDFHDUDQJHRIGHPDQG-
side barriers, including the impact of stigma and discrimination, physical challenges around 
access and transport, and issues DURXQGWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIVXLWDEO\IOH[LEOHMRERSSRUWXQLWLHV¶
Our review of evidence of above adds substantially to this final point, demonstrating that the 
labour market inequalities ± reflected in spatial differences in both the quantity and the 
quality of jobs ± PD\EHFUXFLDOLQVKDSLQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶FDSDFLW\WRFRSHZLWKKHDOWKSUREOHPV
or disability in the workplace.  
 
[NOTE TO CO-AUTHORS: WE WILL ADD REFERENCES TO EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED ELSEWHERE IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE HERE.] 
 
In summary, a review of the most recent literature, including research presented elsewhere in 
this Special Issue, adds to the evidence that a complex combination of factors have combined 
to produce concentrations of DB claiming in disadvantaged labour markets and communities. 
Some of these factors reflect individual barriers, but there is little evidence that these can be 
simplified into a dependency culture that can be addressed through punitive welfare reforms 
or behavioural interventions. Rather, a combination of health/disability limitations and 
employability-related barriers to work combine to leave some people at the back of the queue 
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for jobs (Beatty et al. 2009). This disadvantage is exacerbated in post-industrial labour 
markets where there are not enough opportunities, and where the jobs that are available 
represent a difficult context within which to manage health conditions (and in some cases 
may contribute to ill health). A coherent strategy to provide routes into sustainable 
employment for people on DBs will therefore require: a range of employability-related 
services to provide learning and development opportunities; integrated condition 
management provision to assist claimants to cope with health and disability-related 
limitations; and spatially-focused economic development and workplace strategies designed 
to ensure that there are viable job opportunities for those leaving welfare to enter work. As 
we will see below, the current UK policy agenda falls well short of meeting these demands. 
 
Assessing the policy agenda: welfare-to-work for people on disability benefits in the UK 
and lessons from abroad 
 
Current policy in the UK 
To what extent is the evidence presented above reflected in the UK policy agenda on helping 
people from disability benefits into work? The current policy agenda demonstrates clear 
continuity with work-first approaches to activation. Within such approaches, the nature of the 
SUREOHPLVVHHQDVPDLQO\URRWHGLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXUZLWKWKHORJLFDO
conclusion that strengthening conditionality and compulsory activation can affect positive 
change in and for the individual (Lindsay and Dutton 2013).  7KLVµEHKDYLRXULVW¶ORJLFKDV
become more pronounced under the 2010-15 Coalition Government in the UK.  Thus, for UK 
SROLF\PDNHUVµORZMREVHHNLQJH[SHFWDWLRQVFDQDIIHFWRXWFRPHV«SDUWO\GULYHQE\WKH
expectations imposed by the benefits that reVSRQGHQWV>DUH@FODLPLQJ¶':3 ± i.e. 
  
13 
 
it is assumed that compelling people to engage in work-related activity will produce job 
outcomes.  
 
Much of the policy of successive governments in the past decade has focused on increasing 
conditionality and restricting access to benefits (Harris and Rahilly 2011). The replacement 
RIµ,QFDSDFLW\%HQHILW¶ZLWKµ(PSOR\PHQW6XSSRUW$OORZDQFH¶(6$DVWKHPDLQ'%IRU
new claimants from 2008 reflected these priorities. The ESA reform restricted access to the 
most generous benefit replacement rates to only those assessed as facing severe 
KHDOWKGLVDELOLW\EDUULHUVZKRDUHSODFHGLQWRDµ6XSSRUW*URXS¶7KRVHDVVHVVHGDVOHVV
disadvantaged are placed into Dµ:RUN-UHODWHG$FWLYLW\*URXS¶ZKHUHUHFeipt of ESA is 
conditional on engaging in work-focused interviews and other activation provision (see 
GLVFXVVLRQEHORZ8QOLNHLWVSUHGHFHVVRU,QFDSDFLW\%HQHILW(6$¶VFRQWULEXWLRQV-based 
benefit is also limited to one year for the Work-related Activity Group.  Those still claiming 
ESA after this time duration are required to transfer to a means-tested version of the benefit 
(meaning that those with other sources of household income will be denied payment). 
 
Central to the ESA reform was the establishment of a stricter medical assessment ± the Work 
Capability Assessment (WCA) ± as a means of determining benefit entitlement. The WCA 
was introduced for all new ESA claimants by the Labour Government. The Conservative-led 
Coalition Government then committed to re-assessing all existing benefit recipients from 
2011; and there is also the expectation that all ESA claimants will be repeatedly re-assessed 
within two years (whereas previously Incapacity Benefit claimants often reported several 
years between benefit eligibility assessments) (Harris and Rahilly 2011). As noted above, the 
WCA has been designed to separate the most disadvantaged, who are directed to the Support 
Group and receive DBs without condition, from those who might be able to make progress 
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towards employment and are subject to compulsory activation ± the Work-related Activity 
Group.   
 
The measures of disability and work capacity deployed in the WCA process specifically 
sought to µUDise WKHEDU¶LQRUGHUWRUHVWULFWDFFHVVWREHQHILWVIRUDGHWDLOed discussion of 
WCA content and scoring, see Harris and Rahilly 2011). Government clearly communicated 
that its expectation was that only a small minority of claimants should be directed towards the 
unconditional Support Group, and in its first year of operation the WCA found only 10% of 
claimants to be so sick or disabled as to justify this status; 24% of claimants were directed to 
the Work-related Activity Group; and 66% were judged fit for work and denied ESA.  
 
Initial independent reviews confirmed the inadequacy of the WCA process, which was 
DVVHVVHGDVµPHFKDQLVWLF¶µODFNLQJHPSDWK\¶DQGimpractical in attempting to capture the 
impacts of many chronic and/or mental health conditions (Harrington 2010: 31). These 
problems were exacerbated when the 2010 Coalition Government HOLPLQDWHGDµZRUN-focused 
health-UHODWHGDVVHVVPHQW¶HOHPHQWRIWKH:&$DEDWWHU\RITXHVWLRQVGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHD
realistic evaluation of the work that claimants might be capable of, and the workplace 
adjustments that they might require) (HoC 2013). Both Jobcentre and Work Programme staff 
have reported that people with very severe (indeed, sometimes terminal) health conditions 
have been directed towards work-related activity by WCA assessors (Harris and Rahilly 
2011). Many claimants have been able to reverse WCA decisions on appeal (Patrick 2012). 
More recent data suggests that the WCA is being applied more sensitively ± probably in 
response to the high numbers of successful appeals ± in the first quarter of 2013, for example, 
approximately two-fifths of completed WCAs directed claimants to the Support Group.     
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The second, inter-connected element of the current UK model involves extending the reach of 
compulsory activation to many of those on DBs. The first major activation programme 
WDUJHWLQJGLVDELOLW\FODLPDQWVZDVµ3DWKZD\VWR:RUN¶3W:SLORWHGE\WKH/DERXU
Government from 2003 and rolled out fully by 2008. The initiative was initially led by 
Jobcentre Plus, with health-oriented condition management services organized by National 
Health Service (NHS) organizations. As PtW was rolled out nationally, leadership of the 
LQLWLDWLYHZDVFRQWUDFWHGRXWWRPDLQO\SULYDWHVHFWRUµ/HDG3URYLGHUV¶in most regions, 
which quickly saw health condition management marginalized within the programme content 
(Lindsay and Dutton 2012). The main content of PtW instead centred on five compulsory 
work-focused interviews that claimants were required to undergo with Jobcentre Plus or Lead 
Provider personal advisers; and a range of voluntary work preparation programmes based on 
H[LVWLQJµZRUN-ILUVW¶DFWLYDWLRQprovision (Grant 2013). Attendance at work-focused 
interviews was enforced by the threat of benefit sanctions.  As noted above, an NHS-led 
health µFRQGLWLRQPDQDJHPHQWSURJUDPPH¶ZDVLQLWLDOO\SURPRWHGDVDNH\IHDWXUHRI3W:DW
least in those areas where Jobcentre Plus led the initiative), but take-up of the programme was 
low and DWP officials wound-up these services on the grounds that they were not cost-
effective in assisting people into work (DWP 2012), a peculiar criticism given that the 
condition management programme was never charged with achieving job entries for its 
participants (Lindsay and Dutton 2013). Condition management provision was more 
fragmented in those areas where PtW was led by contracted providers, which were not 
required to work with NHS organizations to develop health-focused interventions (Grant 
2013). Overall, the outcomes delivered by PtW were disappointing, with no significant 
HPSOR\PHQWHIIHFWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFODLPDQWV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ1$2 
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From 2011, PtW and all other UK Government activation programmes were amalgamated 
ZLWKLQWKH:RUN3URJUDPPH7KH:RUN3URJUDPPH¶VFRQWHQWYDULHVDFURVVareas$µEODFN
ER[¶IXQding model affords Prime Contractors considerable autonomy in shaping services, 
although a payment-by-results regime that offers limited up-front funding means that there is 
DQLQFHQWLYHWRWDUJHWµTXLFNZLQV¶WKURXJKZRUN-first interventions (such as short, relatively 
inexpensive motivational and job search courses). Accordingly, there is substantial evidence 
RIµFUHDPLQJDQGSDUNLQJ¶DPRQJ:RUN3URJUDPPHDFWLYDWLRQSURYLGHUVFKDUJHGZLWK
improving the employability of those on DBs (HoC 2013). The meagre health-focused 
provision supported under PtW appears to have been further marginalized, with few Work 
Programme providers prioritising condition management services (Ceolta-Smith 2014 in this 
volume). The severity of the barriers faced by many disability claimants, the inadequate and 
LQDSSURSULDWHIXQGLQJPRGHOIRUWKH:RUN3URJUDPPHDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJµSDUNLQJ¶RIWKRVH
with health/disability-related limitations, help to explain the disappointing job outcome 
figures achieved by the programme for people on ESA (Rees et al. 2014).  
 
It is important to note that compulsion and conditionality remain crucial components of the 
:RUN3URJUDPPH¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKWKHVLFNDQGGLVDEOHG (and also defines other work-
related activities that can be demanded of ESA claimants). Failure to engage in work-related 
activity required by Work Programme providers can result in a loss of benefits for four weeks 
for a first offence, rising to thirteen weeks for repeated non-compliance (HoC 2013). There is 
evidence that personal advisers working for both Jobcentre Plus and Work Programme 
SURYLGHUVKDYHEHHQUHOXFWDQWWRUHSRUWµPLVEHKDYLRXU¶WKDWZRXOGUHVXOWLQEHQHILWVDQFWLRQV± 
these street-level professionals appear to be aware of both the vulnerability of many DB 
claimants, and that sanctioning is likely to undermine attempts to build a relationship of trust 
between claimant and adviser (Barnes et al. 2010). Consequently, under both the Work 
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Programme and its predecessor PtW, sanction rates have been relatively low (Grant 2013). 
However, inadequate expertise and information exchange between Jobcentre Plus and Work 
Programme providers (along with the vagaries of the WCA process) continues to see 
inappropriate sanctioning of vulnerable sick and disabled people (HoC 2013).    
 
In summary, a narrow work-first focus defines current activation strategies for people on 
DBs. Policy makers remain reluctant to programme health provision as a central element of 
their approach, despite evidence as to the substantial health and disability-related limitations 
faced by claimants. Nor is there evidence of government interest in the role of employers ± or 
the broader nature, level and location of labour demand ± in shaping the disability benefits 
problem. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the outFRPHVSURGXFHGE\WKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V
focus on conditionality and activation have been disappointing. As noted above, while 
increasing the conditions required both to access and receive benefits may reduce on-flow, 
there will be no progress in terms of impURYLQJSHRSOH¶VHPSOR\DELOLW\RUKHDOWK<HWZH
know from the review of evidence above, and analyses of the characteristics of returners-to-
work, that improving employability and health are both key to positive transitions for DB 
claimants, and that labour market and workplace factors define the opportunities available to 
them (Sissons and Barnes 2013). We now turn to evidence from a very different welfare state 
± Denmark ± in an attempt to identify any lessons that can be learned from its policy and 
practice in seeking to assist the sick and disabled from welfare to work.  
 
Lessons from abroad: current policy in Denmark 
BENT ± CAN YOU PLEASE ADD APPROXIMATELY 1000 WORDS HERE 
SUMMARISING POLICY IN DENMARK AND DRAWING CONTRASTS WITH THE 
WORK-FIRST/CONDITIONALITY-FOCUSED MODEL IN THE UK?  
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our review above confirms the disconnect between the evidence on the nature of the 
GLVDELOLW\EHQHILWVµSUREOHP¶DQGDQLQFUHDVLQJO\QDUURZDQGEHKDYLRXULVWSROLF\DJHQGD
under successive UK governments. Policy makers have taken the easy option of presenting 
KLJKQXPEHUVRISHRSOHRQ'%DVDSUREOHPRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXUVOHDGLQJ
to a logical conclusion of increasing conditionality in the benefits system and compulsory 
activation. The 2010-15 Coalition Government in particular has appropriated and 
misrepresented the debate on hidden unemployment in post-industrial labour markets in an 
attempt to manufacture evidence of malingering. A fair review of the evidence points to a 
different and messier reality. People trapped on DBs for long periods often face substantial 
health problems and disability-related limitations, which explain why they left the workplace, 
shape their attitudes towards work, and predict trajectories in and out of employment. Many 
of the same people also report employability-related barriers, ranging from gaps in basic 
skills to isolation from social networks. And crucially, the geography of labour markets 
defines the opportunities open to DB claimants facing a combination of health and 
employability-related barriers. Such people will inevitably be at the back of the queue for 
jobs, but their disadvantage is accentuated in post-industrial labour markets where the 
employment destroyed during the 1980s and 1990s has never been fully replaced, and where 
the jobs that are available are characterized by casualization and insecurity, low-pay, work 
intensification and low control. There are fewer jobs; the jobs that are available are not the 
sort that allow people to manage health conditions in the workplace; and the low quality of 
work may instead be contributing to concentrations of ill health. These factors are crucial to 
explaining much higher levels of DB claiming (even after controlling for area-based health 
inequalities) in depressed labour markets.   
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The preceding literature and evidence review can be seen as largely confirmatory, adding to 
the analyses presented in previous multi-sourced reviews of research (see, for example, 
Beatty et al. 2009; Houston and Lindsay 2010; Bambra 2011; Lindsay and Houston 2011). 
However, while our discussion specifically draws upon and confirms the analysis provided 
by, for example, Lindsay and Houston (2013), there are areas where this article ± and much 
of the evidence presented elsewhere in this Special Issue ± offer new insights. First, in this 
article and elsewhere in this volume, authors have broadened the multi-disciplinary approach 
to researching the nature of disability claiming and potential policy solutions. For example, 
we have drawn attention to robust clinical studies that have identified both significant health 
barriers among those on DBs (Kellett et al. 2011; Garthwaite et al. 2014) and apparent 
progress following well-evidenced clinical interventions (see Kellett et al. 2014 in this 
volume). Elsewhere, we have sought to highlight a broader evidence base on how the 
workplace and labour market shape opportunities and barriers for people on DBs (Baumberg 
2014; Beatty and Fothergill 2014 in this volume).    
 
We have DOVRVRXJKWWROLQNWKLVXSGDWHGDQGH[SDQGHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHµQDWXUHRIWKH
SUREOHP¶WRDVKDUSO\FULWLFDOHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHFXUUHQW8.SROLF\DJHQGDWe have argued 
that there is a disconnect between the multi-faceted complexity of the DB problem and the 
rationale and content of UK policy, which is rooted in a behaviourist logic and largely relies 
upon a combination of increased conditionality and work-first activation. Such approaches 
might reduce on-flow in the short-term ± it is self-evident that any determined effort to 
enhance regulation to restrict benefit-claiming will reduce the number of successful claims. 
,QGHHGSROLF\PDNHUV¶MXVWLILFDWLRQRIWKHLUZHOIDUHUHIRUm and activation agendas tend to 
rest upon such tautologies. Policies are seen as working where new conditions have limited 
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access to welfare benefits or, for example, where a strengthening of compulsion has indeed 
produced more of the compulsory activity. Accordingly, for policy makers, using the WCA to 
restrict access to disability benefits and instead direct people to JSA is justified by the 
IROORZLQJUHGXQGDQF\µGLVDEOHGSHRSOHFODLPLQJ-6$ZKLFKUHTXLUHVFODLPDQWVWRORRNIRU
work, are much more likeO\WRORRNIRUZRUN¶':3    
 
But it is difficult to see how such policies have any relevance to improving the long-term 
employability and health (or mitigating the disability-related limitations) of people on DBs. It 
is therefore unsurprising that job outcomes for people on ESA have been disappointing under 
the Work Programme, as they were for Incapacity Benefit claimants under PtW. More 
generally, after almost twenty years of compulsion, conditionality and work-first (and little 
else) in the content of UK activation policy, the geographical concentrations of the benefit 
claiming, the people affected, and the barriers that they face, remain largely unchanged.  
    
Finally, we have seen that alternative policy approaches are possible. Denmark has grappled 
with its own disability benefits problem, but has adopted very different policy responses, 
rooted in a more sophisticated measure of work capacity, a stronger role for human capital-
oriented activation, and collaboration with employers to facilitate adjustments in the 
workplace and/or job content. The continuing high levels of claiming in parts of Denmark 
highlight the limitations of any supply-side policy in addressing the complex combination of 
issues that trap people on benefits for long periods. However, there are principles in the 
Danish model ± especially the engagement of employers as full partners in assisting people to 
make transitions from welfare to work ± that would appear to be of value in the UK context. 
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A number of lessons for policy are discernable from the preceding discussion. If individuals 
are to be assisted into sustainable employment (rather than merely prevented from claiming 
benefits) there is a need for well-funded, targeted activation programmes that are flexible 
enough to deal with the range of employability-related barriers faced by people on DBs. 
Arriving at a more holistic, evidence-based approach to addressing employability-related 
barriers will need UK policy makers to grow out of their fixation with narrow, behaviourist 
DSSURDFKHVWRµLQFHQWLYLVLQJ¶FODLPDQWVWRUHWXUQWRZRUN$VZHQRWHDERYHLQGLYLGXDOV¶
attitudes and motivations around work vary considerably, and there is a case to be made for 
interventions that seek to improve the self-efficacy of people on DBs (Fear 2009). But the 
evidence suggests that such factors are an important, but far from crucial, element in the 
disadvantage experienced by people on DBs. A supply-side policy agenda that relies almost 
entirely on benefit sanctions, harsh conditionality and work-first activation is not fit for 
purpose (Lindsay and Houston 2013). Meanwhile, current policies to limit benefit uprating 
and increase the reach of means-testing are less likely to incentivize job seeking than to 
increase the risk of poverty among claimants (Beatty and Fothergill 2014 in this volume) and 
so further undermine their employability.  
  
People claiming DBs face a range of health and disability-related barriers, which vary in their 
complexity and severity. Accordingly, there is a need to retain a system that separates out a 
µZRUN-UHODWHGDFWLYLW\JURXS¶ who can be helped towards a return to work, from those facing 
the most severe barriers. The establishment of this distinction under ESA was positive in 
HOLPLQDWLQJDV\VWHPWKDWSUHYLRXVO\µconflated two groups ± those whose health problems so 
severe that they would remain on sickness benefits in all circumstances and those who would 
have been able to work if suitable jobs had been avDLODEOH¶ (Beatty and Fothergill 2005: 844). 
However, the UK can learn from many other EU states, including Denmark, which use more 
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sophisticated measures of ZRUNFDSDFLW\ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH8.¶VVLPSOLVWLF WCA) to identify 
both barriers and capabilities. Better quality capability measurement can help to inform both 
health-focused condition management programmes and workplace adjustments that will be 
needed if we are to assist people to move from welfare to work. Clearly, any assessment of 
work capacity needs to be based on robust clinical measurement rather than pre-set 
government targets for removing people for benefits (Harris and Rahilly 2011). Most 
importantly, policy makers must accept that the vast majority of DB claimants face health 
and disability-related barriers, and that condition management support and occupational 
health services will be an essential element in helping people to cope with these limitations in 
the workplace.  
 
There is also a need for health and employability provision to be joined-up with policies to 
address the labour market and workplace aspects of the DB problem. Inequalities in the 
quality and availability of work are crucial to explaining the concentration of DB claiming in 
post-industrial regions. Demand-side interventions that promote jobs growth will therefore be 
required to address these inequalities. A further contribution of this article, and others in this 
Special Issue, is to emphasize the need for workplace interventions. Too many of the jobs 
that are seen as appropriate destinations for people leaving DBs are in fact defined by content 
and conditions that are unconducive to managing health and disability limitations at work. 
There is a need for renewed a partnership between the state and employers ± the state should 
incentivize adjustments to the work environment and job content that might facilitate returns-
to-work for people on DBs; employers need to play a proactive role in identifying potential 
adjustments and creating a management culture that assists the re-integration of those 
managing health conditions or disabilities. Some may claim that this suggestion makes 
unrealistic demands of employers, but the regional variations in DB numbers are partly 
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explained by the manner in which recruiters in tight labour markets are already making 
LQIRUPDODGMXVWPHQWVWRWKHLUH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGMREGHPDQGV,QµIXOOHPSOR\PHQW¶UHJLRQV
employers are more likely to recruit people with health or disability-related barriers given the 
abVHQFHRIµVODFN¶LQlocal labour markets (i.e. where nobody else is available, employers are 
forced to adjust their demands to facilitate the employment of people with health conditions 
or disabilities). Policy makers should engage with employers to formalize and transfer a 
culture of flexibility and adjustment across all labour markets and workplaces.   
 
None of the critics of current UK policy advocate doing nothing to activate those on DBs 
who could potentially return to work. For Bambra and Smith (2010: µPRUHSDVVLYH
approaches have often exacerbated the labour market exclusion experienced by people with a 
GLVDELOLW\RUFKURQLFLOOQHVV¶Similarly, Beatty et al. (2009: 718) criticize the policy inertia of 
the 1980s and 1990s that saw all stakeholders µturn a blind eye to the scale of the issue¶
There is a clear need for policy action. Increasing conditionality and means-testing, and 
compelling DB claimants to participate in work-first activation, may discourage some from 
claiming benefits ± WKHµGHWHUUHQFHHIIHFW¶RIWHQFHOHEUDWHGE\ZRUN-first advocates (for 
discussion, see Daguerre and Etherington 2009) ± but these measures are unlikely to produce 
long-term improvements in employability or health. We believe that our review of evidence 
above, lessons from countries like Denmark, and the findings of research presented elsewhere 
in this Special Issue, point to the need for a different approach. A renewed commitment to 
evidence-based policy in this area would produce holistic strategies to address health, 
employability and labour market-related barriers ± the complex and inter-connected factors 
that explain why too many people in the UK remain trapped on long-term disability benefits.  
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